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Latin America is characterized by high and persistent schooling, land, and income 
inequalities and extreme income concentration.  In a highly unequal setting, 
powerful interests are more likely to dominate politics, pushing for policies that 
protect privileges rather than foster competition and growth. As a result, changes in 
policies that political elites resist may be postponed in high-inequality countries to 
the detriment of overall economic performance. 
 
This paper examines the relationship between structural, high inequality—measured 
by high levels of schooling inequality—and liberalization of the financial sector for a 
sample of 37 developing and developed countries for the period 1975 to 2000.  
Liberalization of the financial sector can be broadly thought of in the Latin 
American pre-2000 context as opening credit markets that earlier were largely 
restricted, including by ending directed credit.  For our measure of structural 
inequality we use data on schooling Gini coefficients that have not previously been 
used in this context.  In our sample, we find that increases in financial liberalization 
were associated with bank crises and other domestic and external shocks, and that 
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Latin America is characterized by high and persistent schooling, land, and income inequalities 
and extreme income concentration.  In a highly unequal setting, powerful interests are more 
likely to dominate politics, pushing for policies that protect privileges rather than foster 
competition and growth. As a result, changes in policies that political elites resist may be 
postponed in high-inequality countries to the detriment of overall economic performance. 
 
This paper examines the relationship between structural, high inequality—measured by high 
levels of schooling inequality—and liberalization of the financial sector for a sample of 37 
developing and developed countries for the period 1975 to 2000.  Liberalization of the 
financial sector can be broadly thought of in the Latin American pre-2000 context as opening 
credit markets that earlier were largely restricted, including by ending directed credit.  For our 
measure of structural inequality we use data on schooling Gini coefficients that have not 
previously been used in this context.  In our sample, we find that increases in financial 
liberalization were associated with bank crises and other domestic and external shocks, and 
that higher schooling inequality reduces the impetus for liberalization brought on by bank 
crises. 
                                                 
1 Jere R. Behrman is W.R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Economics at University of Pennsylvania; Nancy Birdsall is 
President of the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C.; and Gunilla Pettersson is a PhD student at 
the Department of Economics, University of Sussex, UK. This paper is based on a note prepared for the CGD 
Task Force on Helping Reforms Deliver Growth in Latin America, generously supported by the Open Society 
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the schooling Gini coefficient data with us, and Michael Clemens and participants at a CGD Research Seminar 
for useful comments. 
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Recent studies suggest that inequality, contrary to once-conventional wisdom, is bad for 
economic growth and development (Cornia and Court 2001; Easterly 2002). Latin America as 
a region may have been a particular victim of this negative relationship.  Birdsall and 
Londoño (1997) find a negative relationship between inequality of schooling and inequality of 
land ownership with growth in a cross-country study.  They show that Latin America is not a 
negative outlier in the effect of high income inequality on growth once inequality of these two 
assets is taken into account. 
For Latin America, de Janvry and Sadoulet (1999) and Carter (2004) report the persistence for 
decades of a relationship between past land inequality and current income inequality.  
Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely (2000) find high persistence of schooling inequality across 
generations in Latin America compared to the U.S.  These studies suggest that Latin America 
suffers from a longstanding problem of inequality of assets, of schooling and of income. 
The question we address in this paper is whether there is a relationship between schooling 
inequality, meant to capture the concentration of power with a small political elite, and the 
undertaking of policy changes that liberalize and make more open the financial sector. As far 
as we know this question has not heretofore been addressed for Latin America or for any 
other region. 
We begin by documenting the extent and nature of inequality and liberalizing efforts in Latin 
America.  Then we discuss the motivation for our interest in the relationship between 
inequality and financial policy shifts, and set out the simple framework used to test this 
relationship before presenting our regression results.  We end with a brief conclusion. 
Inequality and Measures of Reform in Latin America 
In this section we describe the extent of inequality in Latin America, the evolution of 
economic reforms, and the financial liberalization index that we use to construct the 
dependent variable in our simple model of inequality and financial liberalization. 
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Income, Schooling, and Land Inequality 
Latin America has a long history of persistent and high inequality.  In the 1980s, income 
inequality measured by the income Gini coefficient ranged from a “low” of 0.41 in Argentina 
to a high of 0.57 in Brazil.  Average income inequality in the region as a whole for this period 
was 0.50 compared to 0.30 for high-income OECD countries, and 0.45 for East Asia.  Land 
inequality was also extremely high in Latin America with an average land Gini coefficient of 
0.84.  By 2000, average income inequality in Latin America had risen to 0.54, in East Asia to 
0.49, and in high-income OECD countries to 0.32. 
Schooling inequality, measured in terms of grades of schooling attained across adults, was 
also high in Latin America in the early to mid-80s, averaging 0.46 (schooling Gini 
coefficient) compared to 0.29 in high-income OECD countries, and 0.39 for East Asia.
2  The 
countries with the highest schooling inequality were both among the poorest in the region 
(Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), and the richest (Mexico).  Average schooling 
inequality has declined over time, in 2000, the schooling Gini for Latin America as a region 
was 0.42, for East Asia 0.35, and for high-income OECD countries 0.26. 
The decline in schooling inequality in nearly all developing countries since the 1980s is partly 
due to the fact that most governments have increased spending on basic education.  In Latin 
America the median schooling Gini coefficient has fallen from 0.42 in 1980 to about 0.40 in 
2000.
3  The trend since the mid-70s of declining schooling inequality combined with rising 
income inequality holds for all the Latin American countries in our sample except Peru 
(Figure 1).
4 Although the overall trend is a decline in schooling inequality, there is notable 
variation in the schooling inequality paths of our sample countries. For example, schooling 
inequality in Colombia rose until the mid-90s and then started declining. In Ecuador, 
schooling inequality declined and then rose before declining again. 
                                                 
2 We refer to schooling rather than education inequality throughout the paper since the inequality measure we 
use captures inequality in the grades of schooling attained.  Education inequality is a broader concept that 
includes other forms of “learning” and school quality in addition to grades completed in formal education 
(schooling). 
3 For the countries included in our sample. 
4 The correlation between the median income Gini and median schooling Gini is -0.91. 
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Median schooling Gini for Latin America 
Median income Gini for Latin America
Sources: WIID 2a and Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001).   
Extreme Income Concentration 
Not only are income, land and schooling inequalities widespread in Latin America, but 
income concentration is extremely high in all countries.  The income share of the top 20 
percent of the population in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela was 45 percent or more in 1980 (Figure 2).  In Brazil, the income 
share of the top 20 percent accounted for an extraordinary 62 percent of total income.  By 
contrast, the income share of the poorest 20 percent of the population was only about 2-6 
percent in each country.  Income equality did not improve in the late 1990s despite economic 
reforms meant to promote growth and reduce poverty.  Instead, the average income share of 
the bottom quintile was reduced from an average 4 percent to 3 percent, and the income share 
of the top quintile rose from roughly 57 percent to 59 percent (WIID 2a; authors’ 
calculations). 
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Income share bottom 20% of population 1980 (percent)
Income share top 20% of population 1980 (percent)
Note: Numbers above bars are 1980 income Ginis.
Source: WIID 2.0a.      
Income shares bottom and top 











Measuring Policy Changes in Latin America since the mid-80s 
In this section we look at two measures of financial liberalization: the financial liberalization 
index created by Abiad and Mody (2005), and the structural policies index, and its sub-
indices, constructed by Lora (2001).
5 
Abiad and Mody (2005) provide a comprehensive measure of the extent of financial 
liberalization for 41 countries including 13 from Latin America.  Their index consists of seven 
components: directed credit/reserve requirements, entry barriers/pro-competition measures, 
international capital controls, privatization of banks, interest rate controls, banking 
                                                 
5 Another measure of the extent of financial liberalization constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008) was not used in 
our analysis since it captures cross-border financial transactions only, not domestic financial liberalization unlike 
the Abiad and Mody (2005) index used in this paper. 
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supervision and regulation, and security markets.  The index ranges from zero to one, and a 
higher score indicates more widespread financial liberalization. 
The change in the financial liberalization index from 1985 to 1995 is substantial for all Latin 
American countries, with several countries quadrupling their indices over the period.  The 
average score for Latin America tripled from 0.2 in 1985 to 0.6 in 1995.  In 1995 Argentina 
was the country that had reformed the most by this measure, while Brazil and Costa Rica had 
the lowest scores in the region (Table 1).  By comparison, the financial liberalization index for 
East Asia rose from a higher initial level, 0.46 to 0.72, and for the high-income OECD 
countries the index increased from 0.7 to 0.9 over the same period.  South Asia is lagging 
behind the other regions with a score of 0.4, but given its low starting level in 1985 (close to 
0.1) reform progress, as measured by changes in the index, has been relatively fast. 
The Lora (2001) structural policies index only exists for Latin American countries.  It 
describes and measures the degree of liberalization in the areas of trade policy, taxation, 
privatization, financial and capital market policies, and labor markets.  All Latin American 
countries have undertaken widespread liberalization as indicated by changes in the Lora 
structural policies index.  The regional average on the index in 1985 was 0.33; by 1995 it had 
risen to 0.53.  (A score equal to 1 indicates the highest observation in the sample over the 
period.)  
Looking at the sub-indices of the Lora index we find that it is trade and financial liberalization 
that dominate, with the regional average for both roughly doubling over the period 1985-1995 
(also see Lora and Panizza 2002).
6  As noted by Rodrik (1996, p. 18) “…it is striking how 
many Latin American countries have come within reaching distance of completing the items 
on the ‘Washington Consensus’ in a period of no more than a few years during the 1980s.  
Mexico, Bolivia, and Argentina, to cite some of the more distinguished examples, have 
undertaken more trade and financial liberalization and privatization within five years than the 
East Asian countries have managed in three decades.” 
                                                 
6 The financial liberalization index and the financial liberalization component of Lora’s structural policies index 
are highly correlated.  The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the financial liberalization index and Lora’s 
financial policy sub-index is 0.73 and statistically significant at 1%. 
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Argentina 0.10 0.81 0.34 0.60
Bolivia 0.33 0.71 0.29 0.61
Brazil 0.05 0.38 0.26 0.52
Chile 0.52 0.71 0.49 0.58
Colombia 0.05 0.62 0.29 0.52
Costa Rica 0.10 0.38 0.31 0.54
Ecuador 0.05 0.62 0.31 0.54
El Salvador n/a n/a 0.35 0.49
Guatemala 0.14 0.62 0.34 0.51
Honduras n/a n/a n/a 0.49
Mexico 0.14 0.76 0.40 0.53
Nicaragua n/a n/a 0.29 0.57
Paraguay n/a n/a 0.36 0.56
Peru 0.19 0.81 0.28 0.60
Uruguay 0.48 0.71 0.37 0.45
Venezuela 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.48
Latin America
4 0.21 0.61 0.33 0.53
East Asia
5 0.46 0.72 n/a n/a
South Asia
6 0.08 0.37 n/a n/a
High-Income OECD
7 0.68 0.91 n/a n/a
Notes: 
1. Abiad and Mody (2003) index.  The higher the score the more reforms have been undertaken.
2. The higher the score the more reforms have been undertaken.
3. The group mean for Lora reform index in 1995 excludes Honduras.
4. The Lora index only exists for Latin American countries.
5. East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
6. South Asia includes Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Sources: Abiad and Mody (2003), Lora (2001) and WDI (2005).
Regional averages, (unweighted)
3
7. High-Income OECD countries are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom and 
United States.
 
Table 1 shows regional and individual country scores for both measures.  It is clear, as noted 
above, that there has been widespread policy change in the region, although Latin American 
countries began to liberalize their economies in earnest much later than countries in East Asia 
and high-income OECD countries.  The fastest pace of change was between 1989 and 1994 
(Lora and Panizza 2002). 
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Figure 3 shows the progress of financial liberalization for the period 1973 to 2002 for four 
regions: Latin America, East Asia, South Asia and high-income OECD countries.  The degree 
of financial liberalization as measured by the Abiad and Mody financial liberalization index 
was fairly similar for high-income OECD countries and East Asian countries in 1973; in 
contrast Latin America and South Asia had undertaken little financial liberalization at the 
time.  In East Asia and South Asia financial liberalization has been fairly gradual, whereas in 
Latin America these policy changes were carried out during a much shorter period of time, 
beginning in the mid-1980s. 
Table A1 illustrates the unevenness of liberalizing changes across Latin American countries.  
For example, significant changes have been carried out in Chile compared to other countries 
in the region in all areas except privatization.  Argentina has fallen behind with respect to 




Is There A Relationship between Inequality and Financial Liberalization? 
Longstanding and high inequality as is the case in Latin America may have had direct effects 
on whether and what liberalizing reforms were undertaken, and in what sequence, and indirect 
effects on reforms through its impact on the evolution of institutions that were important to 
the implementation of reforms. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) document how countries with certain initial factor 
endowments – abundant labor and climates and soils conducive to growing cash crops on 
large plantations – came to have very unequal distributions of wealth, human capital, and 
political power.  The elite classes tended to perpetuate these inequalities through institutions 
that protected their interests and allowed them to appropriate public resources.  As a result, 
                                                 
7 The extent of labor market reform varies a lot across countries.  The worst performers in terms of labor reform 
over the period 1985-1995 as measured by changes in the Lora labor market liberalization sub-index are Bolivia, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, and Colombia, whereas Brazil and Guatemala scored the highest on the labor market 
liberalization component in 1995.  The degree of privatization varies substantially in the region.  Whereas during 
the period there were hardly any privatizations in Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay, cumulative privatizations 
worth between approximately 8-15 percent of GDP were carried out in Bolivia, Peru and Argentina (Lora 2001). 
In terms of tax policy liberalization, Paraguay, Costa Rica and Guatemala are the countries in the region that 
have taken reforms the farthest. 
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institutions that protect the rights of the general population and encourage productive 
economic activity did not fully develop in many Latin American countries. 






















































































































 Source: Authors’ computation based on Abiad and Mody (2005). 
Inequality may also have a direct negative influence on the reform process.  Rodrik (1996) 
and Birdsall (2001) among others suggest why this may be the case.  Over time structural 
conditions in Latin America have tended to leave political as well as economic power in the 
hands of a small elite. In a highly unequal setting, powerful interests are more likely to 
dominate politics, and will push for policies that protect their privileges rather than foster 
competition and growth. They are likely to support reforms, however, in the face of domestic 
or external circumstances beyond their control. A typical example is a bank or currency crisis 
when there is a need to calm the markets and bolster foreign investor confidence, or when the 
benefits to reform are large for the elite, and the cost of inaction substantial. 
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In addition, high inequality may help trigger populist bouts of fiscal and monetary 
indiscipline, particularly prior to elections (IDB 1999). Also, to the extent high income 
inequality inhibits access to education (as shown for Latin America by Behrman et al. 2000), 
it may indirectly slow reform; Rodrik (1996) for example suggests that having a well-
educated labor force may be necessary for reforms to work
8; the history of failed 
conditionality in World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs suggests that reforms 
unlikely to work, though promised, are seldom actually implemented
9. 
 
A simple framework 
We follow Abiad and Mody (2005) in assuming that financial reform occurs in response to 
some combination of domestic and external shocks coupled with longstanding structural 
factors. 
Relevant shocks in the case of Latin America might be the apparent failure of the import 
substitution model; the pressure from international institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for structural reform; the increasing worldwide trend toward 
liberalization as the norm; and domestic or external financial and economic crises. 
We include a bank crisis variable in the estimation to control for domestic shocks, with past 
bank crises expected to induce financial reform by forcing decision-makers to address 
existing weaknesses in the economy, including in financial markets.  To capture external 
shocks we include the US interest rate.  For any given domestic interest rate, we expect a 
higher US interest rate to be positively related to the pace of reform since it puts pressure on 
policymakers to address weaknesses in domestic financial markets in order to reduce capital 
outflows. In addition, we include an IMF program variable to test if countries with an IMF 
program in place have undertaken more financial liberalization.  We include average GDP per 
capita growth in the previous five-year period to test if higher growth is associated with more 
financial reforms being carried out as the economic environment becomes more 
accommodating. 
                                                 
8 The hypothesis that higher inequality limits growth because it leads to higher public expenditures for 
redistributive purposes has not borne up to empirical testing as there is no evidence that greater public 
expenditures as a proportion of GDP are associated with lower growth – indeed, to the contrary, greater public 
expenditures are seemingly associated with higher growth (see Easterly and Rebelo 1993). 
9 Easterly (2008) Repeated SALs; waivers of conditions  
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To represent structural factors we use two variables: a measure of a country’s quality of 
institutions and schooling inequality.  Institutions are likely to influence reforms because the 
more effective a country’s institutions are, the easier it is for a country to initiate and sustain 
policy shifts.  We treat schooling inequality as a structural factor reflecting longstanding and 
persistent social and political arrangements associated with lack of interest on the part of 
elites in educating the masses (Lindert 2004), and a lack of accountability of decisionmakers 
to the population as a whole.
10 We expect higher levels of schooling inequality to postpone 
financial liberalization and reduce its extent.  Financial liberalization can undo privileged 
access to credit at repressed interest rates and increase competition in banking, and as result 
tends not to be in the interest of powerful industrial and other groups.  Consequently, 
liberalization is delayed until forced by domestic or external pressures beyond the control of 
these influential interest groups, or until the economic circumstances change so that 
liberalization becomes increasingly perceived as sufficiently beneficial.  We use an 
interaction term between the schooling Gini and the bank crisis dummy to test our conjecture 
that the impetus for a policy shift created by a banking crisis is lower the higher is inequality 
in a country. 
To control for the likely possibility that countries that have liberalized more (score higher on 
the financial liberalization index) have less scope for further change than countries that have 
liberalized less we construct a liberalization gap variable. This variable is simply the 
maximum value of the financial liberalization index (a value of 1) minus the actual value of 
the liberalization index each period, for each country, following the approach of Fabrizio and 
Mody (2008). 
Figure 4 is a simple scatter plot of the difference in the financial liberalization index between 
1973 and 1995 against schooling Gini coefficients in 1970.  There seems to be an inverse 
relationship between financial liberalization and schooling inequality as measured by these 
variables.  That is, higher schooling inequality in 1970 appears to be associated with less 
financial liberalization having been undertaken for the countries in the sample. 
 
                                                 
10 Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) suggest that the concentration of wealth in Latin America reflects its initial 
physical endowment combined with slavery or coercive, but sanctioned use of indigenous labor, which provided 
no incentive for those in power to provide education to the masses. See Lindert (2004) on the relation between 
democracy and universal access to schooling in 19
th century Europe and North America.  
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Data 
We use the change in the Abiad and Mody (2005) financial liberalization index over each 
period as the dependent variable in our regressions for a panel of 37 developing and 
developed countries over the period 1975 to 2000 divided into five 5-year periods (Table 
A5).
11 
To test the relationship between inequality and liberalization we use the quinquennial 
schooling Gini coefficient dataset constructed by Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001), which has 
not previously been used in this context.
12  Average years of schooling of the adult population 
(15 years and older) based on grades completed also comes from Thomas, Wang, and Fan 
(2001).  For institutional quality we use two (out of the three) equally weighted components, 
“political rights” and “civil liberties”, of the Freedom House index (Freedom House 2006).  
The index runs from 1 to 7 and a higher score indicates worse performance.  The data on 
banking crises are 0/1 dummy variables constructed from the Bordo et al. (2001: 55) study 
which defines a banking crisis as a period of “financial distress resulting in the erosion of 
most or all of aggregate banking system capital”.  Data on the US interest rate are yields on 
US Treasury securities at 3-month maturity from the Federal Reserve (FR 2006).  Real GDP 
per capita growth is average period growth computed using GDP per capita in constant 2000 
US dollars from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2005).  Finally, the IMF program 
dummy variables come from the IMF’s History of Lending Arrangements (IMF various 
years).  Summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table A2, and correlations in Table 
A3. 
                                                 
11 The reason we use the Abiad and Mody financial liberalization index rather than the financial component of 
the Lora structural policies index is that the latter is only available for Latin American countries, and when 
additional explanatory variables are added the sample size is further reduced.  The correlation between the Abiad 
and Mody financial liberalization index and the financial liberalization component of the Lora structural policies 
index is high though (0.81). 
12 We do not run regressions with income Ginis since there are fewer observations available, which reduces the 
sample size notably, and for several countries only one or two observations are available.  Moreover, many of 
the existing income Ginis are not comparable across countries since they are based on different geographic 
coverage, different segments of the population, and different measures of income (e.g. gross versus net).  
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Sources: Abiad and Mody (2005), Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001), and authors’ calculations. 
 
Regression Results 
We run five panel regressions with country fixed effects using the change in the financial 
liberalization index over each five-year period as the dependent variable.
13  Table 2 shows the 
results.
14 
 In Table 2, the estimate of the schooling Gini coefficient is negative, and is significant in 
column 5 (5% level) where average grades of schooling are also included.
15  
Our key result is that the interaction term between the bank crisis dummy and the schooling 
Gini is always statistically significant at the 5-10% level, and is negative.  This supports the 
                                                 
13 The 1st period is 1975-1979, the 2nd, 1980-1984, the 3rd 1985-1989, the 4
th 1990-1994, and the 5th 1995-
2000. 
14 Results using the level of financial liberalization as the dependent variable are available upon request; these 
suggest that higher schooling inequality may be associated with a lower level of financial liberalization. 
15 The schooling Gini and grade of schooling variables are highly negatively correlated, affecting the standard 
errors and therefore inference, when both variables are included in the model. 
Center for Global Development | www.cgdev.org13 
 
idea that given a bank crisis, higher inequality in a country is associated with less financial 
liberalization being undertaken. 
The bank crisis dummy itself, used to capture the relationship between domestic shocks and 
financial reform, is always positive, and statistically significant (at 5-10%), suggesting that 
bank crises do provide an impetus for financial reform.  The economic size of this effect is 
large; the move from no crisis to a crisis is associated with a 0.35 (positive) change in the 
liberalization index (which ranges from 0 to 1). 
The coefficient on the liberalization gap variable is always statistically significant (1%) and 
negative, suggesting that there is not convergence in financial liberalization (for our sample).  
That is, countries that have more scope for change do not change more on average. 
The measure of institutional quality, the Freedom House index, is positive and significant at 
5-10% in all specifications.  A one standard deviation increase (deterioration) in institutional 
quality, however, is only associated with a 0.04 improvement in the financial liberalization 
index.  A higher score on the Freedom House index indicates lower quality institutions.  Thus, 
contrary to our initial expectations, worse institutions are associated with more financial 
liberalization; Bolivia and Peru are examples of countries with relatively poor Freedom House 
scores where there was major financial liberalization in the 1990s.. 
Our measure of external shock, the US interest rate, is positive and significant (at 5%) except 
for when the schooling attainment variable is included.  This supports the notion that a higher 
US interest rate puts pressure on policymakers to undertake liberalization although the size of 
the effect is small: a 0.03 positive change in the financial liberalization index for a one 
standard deviation increase in the US interest rate.  The dummy for IMF program is also 
positive, and is significant across specifications (at 5-10%) suggesting that external pressure 
in the form of an IMF program may lead to a push for financial policy change (although the 
effect is small). 
The real GDP per capita growth rate in the previous five-year period is never significant 
implying that a more accommodating economic environment, as captured by higher growth, is 
not associated with liberalization. 
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Table 2. Regression Results with Financial Liberalization Index, First Difference   
 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)
Dependent variable:
liberalization gap -0.364*** -0.388*** -0.385***  -0.456*** -0.496***
(0.080) (0.079) (0.079)  (0.084) (0.084)
schooling Gini (15+)  -0.196 -0.160 -0.0702 -1.168***
(0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.44)
Freedom House index 0.0294** 0.0266** 0.0260**  0.0225** 0.0195*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011)
GDP per capita growth (previous period) 0.00273 0.00300 0.00175  0.000193 0.000104
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052)  (0.0053) (0.0053)
IMF program (previous period) 0.0590* 0.0622** 0.0646**  0.0620** 0.0573**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029)
US interest rate  0.0137** 0.0144** 0.0141**  0.0102 0.00746
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0062)  (0.0066) (0.0067)
bank crisis (previous period)  0.0549* 0.201** 0.222** 0.186**
(0.029) (0.089)  (0.085) (0.087)
interaction bank crisis & schooling Gini -0.352* -0.398** -0.319*
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
years of schooling (15+) -0.0486* -0.128***
(0.028) (0.040)
Constant 0.157 0.144 0.112  0.478** 1.520***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) (0.44)
Observations  179 179 179  179 179
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.35
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. On the Freedom House index a 
higher score indicates lower institutional quality.
Financial liberalization index, 5-year difference
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Conclusion 
In a highly unequal setting, powerful interests are more likely to dominate politics, 
pushing for policies that protect privileges rather than foster competition and growth.  It 
may also be the case that political elites are reluctant to push for and undertake financial 
liberalization until they know its likely benefits, or until they are forced to do so in the 
face of adverse domestic or external shocks.    For our sample of 37 developing and 
developed countries, domestic and external shocks are associated with more financial 
reform being undertaken, and higher schooling inequality reduces the impetus for policy 
change brought on by bank crises. 
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Table A1. Latin America: Degree of Liberalization by Area 1985 and 1995 




Paraguay, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Argentina













Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Guatemala, Peru, 





Ecuador, Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Mexico, 
Bolivia, Venezuela, 
Peru, Brazil   
Venezuela, Guatemala, 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Brazil    
Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, 
Argentina, Mexico, 
Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Nicaragua, Ecuador
Venezuela, Paraguay, 
Costa Rica, Peru, 
Mexico, El Salvador, 
Argentina, Brazil
n/a
El Salvador, Honduras, 
Mexico, Venezuela, 
Uruguay, Bolivia
Group average 0.325 0.491 0.249 0.335 n/a 0.546
1995 General reform index Trade index Financial index Tax index Privatization index Labor index
High 
(above regional average)
Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, 
Chile, Nicaragua, 










Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Chile, 
Honduras, El Salvador, 
Bolivia
Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Argentina
Colombia, Brazil, 
Guatemala, Chile, Peru, 







Honduras, El Salvador, 
Venezuela, Uruguay
Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, 




Costa Rica, Venezuela, 








Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Guatemala, El Salvador
Honduras, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Venezuela, 
Uruguay, Bolivia
Group average 0.536 0.878 0.651 0.469 0.149 0.534
Note: Within boxes, countries with the highest index are listed first, followed by the country with the second highest index etc.
Source:  Lora (2001).  
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financial liberalization index, 5 year difference 0.57 0.62 0.28 0.00 1.00 179
reform gap 0.49 0.48 0.29 0.00 1.00 179
schooling Gini (15+) 0.41 0.39 0.15 0.12 0.81 179
years of schooling (15+) 6.5 6.0 2.5 1.9 12.1 179
bank crisis 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 179
freedom house index 3.1 3.0 1.5 1.0 7.0 179
IMF program 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 179
US interest rate 7.6 7.5 2.2 5.5 11.6 179
GDP per capita growth (%) 1.99 1.95 2.44 -4.39 8.63 179  
 
 

























financial liberalization index 1
reform gap -0.87 1.00
schooling Gini (15+) -0.62 0.59 1.00
years of schooling (15+) 0.67 -0.65 -0.92 1.00
bank crisis -0.19 0.25 0.06 -0.16 1.00
freedom house index -0.35 0.35 0.63 -0.65 0.14 1.00
IMF program -0.25 0.24 0.17 -0.22 0.20 0.17 1.00
US interest rate -0.55 0.55 0.13 -0.18 0.09 0.11 0.01 1.00
GDP per capita growth (%) 0.07 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.18 -0.15 0.07 1.00  
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Canada New  Zealand 
Chile Pakistan 
Colombia Peru 
Costa Rica  Philippines 
Ecuador Singapore 
Egypt South  Africa 
France Sri  Lanka 
Germany Thailand 
Ghana Turkey 
Guatemala United  Kingdom 
India United  States 
Indonesia Uruguay 
Israel Venezuela 
Italy   
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Table A5. Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variable Description  Source
financial liberalization 
index
The Abiad and Mody (2005) financial liberalization 
index consists of seven components: directed 
credit/reserve requirements, entry barriers/pro-
competition measures, international capital controls, 
privatization of banks, interest rate controls, banking 
supervision and regulation, and security markets.
Abiad and Mody (2005).
schooling Gini (15+) Schooling Gini for population 15 years and older. Vinod, Wang, and Fan (2001).
average years of 
schooling (15+)
Average years of schooling (based on grade 
completed) for adult population.
Vinod, Wang, and Fan (2001).
GDP per capita growth Average real period GDP per capita growth, percent World Income Inequality Database V 2.0a 
(2005),
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
freedom house index Equally weighted average of the "political rights" and 
the "civil liberties" components of the Freedom House 
index. The index lies in the range 1 to 7 and a higher 




bank crisis Dummy equal to one if systemic banking crisis 
(defined as much or all of bank capital being 
exhausted), zero otherwise.












reform gap Maximum value of the financial liberalization index 
(1) minus actual score on the financial liberalization 
index in each period.
Abiad and Mody (2005), authors' computations.
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